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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
  The history of research on prisoners in the United States is marred with a shameful past 
of abuse and coercion.  With the development of research ethics arising from the Nuremberg 
Code and the Belmont Report, a critical light was shone on these oppressive practices. In 1974, 
the Department of Health and Human Services commissioned a group to investigate the 
conditions under which prisoners were used a research subjects and to formulate 
recommendations to guide clinicians in the future.  The results of this Commission Report paved 
the way for Subpart C of the HHS regulations, which classifies prisoners as a vulnerable 
population and created a de facto ban on the use of inmates in any research study that received 
federal funding.  What made this situation particularly noteworthy was the position of the FDA 
following this eventful change in regulation.  Initially, the FDA proposed a rule similar to that of 
HHS which would have effectively barred the use of prisoners in all clinical research on FDA-
regulated products, even that which was privately funded.  This proposal was met with staunch 
resistance, and a lawsuit filed by prisoners and a pharmaceutical company claimed that their 
constitutional rights would be violated by this de facto ban.  The FDA eventually settled the case, 
and never again revisited the issue.  But recently, the question of the propriety of using prisoners 
in clinical trials has once again entered the public consciousness.  The vast discrepancy in 
approaches to this sensitive issue by the two major bodies tasked with its regulation yields 
fruitful insight into the moral and ethical implications of research on prisoners.  Strong advocates 
on both sides of the issue insist that respect for persons, beneficence, and justice all weigh 
heavily in their favor.  These issues come most starkly into relief when viewed through an Eighth 
Amendment paradigm of “cruel and unusual punishment,” as well as a Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis under a “due process” and “equal protection” framework.  The timeliness of this issue is 
apparent given the recent developments in this area of bioethics which has been relatively 
dormant for decades.  A report by the Institute of Medicine in 2006, followed by an Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from the HHS in 2011, indicates that change is afoot.  Now is 
the critical moment to appraise the situation and strike the appropriate balance between 
protecting prisoners from abuse, universalizing the regulatory landscape to promote medical 
progress, and ensuring that the constitutional rights of prisoners as a class are defended. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The development and progress of medical science relies on a process of trial and error 
through which innovative therapies and groundbreaking techniques are proven safe and effective.  
This method requires experimentation on those willing to contribute their bodies to the 
advancement of medicine.  Every new lifesaving breakthrough begins with one human subject, 
the first person to give himself to the clinical trial with the hope and trust that he will come out 
alive.  Without these volunteers, drug development as it operates today could not exist.  But a 
question arises when we think about these brave human subjects who risk everything to 
contribute to medical progress—what motivates them and do they know what could happen if a 
drug is actually unsafe and ineffective?  A litany of atrocities over the course of human history 
have led to a set of norms about the permissible risks we allow people to take and a basic level of 
understanding and voluntariness they must possess before they are allowed to participate.  It is in 
reference to certain populations that these questions come to the fore: the destitute, the disabled 
or mentally-ill, children and the elderly, pregnant women, and prisoners.  The regulation of 
research on prisoners in the United States is particularly note-worthy given that there is no clear 
consensus of the “right answer,” even among the federal bodies tasked with making the decision.   
In this paper, I will examine why there exists a discrepancy between the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations of research on prisoners and those of the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).  I will also explore whether the current regulatory regime 
should be adjusted to reflect the changing landscape of drug development and experimentation.  
In Part I, I will discuss the development of the doctrine of informed consent and the primary 
historical events in the timeline of human subject research that led to the promulgation of the 
Belmont Report.  Part II will address the history of research on prisoners in the United States 2 
 
prior to the develop of codes of research ethics, demonstrating how and why this debate arose 
and what led many to fear the use of prisoners in medical experimentation. Part III will flesh out 
the ethics of the debate and the arguments for and against using inmates as research subjects.   In 
Part IV, I will sketch the current regulatory landscape of prisoner research, explaining the 
parallel jurisdiction of HHS and the FDA.  I will describe the impetus for HHS’ total ban on 
prisoner subject research, as well as the FDA’s initial move towards a ban but subsequent 
removal of most restrictions on private pharmaceutical companies’ experimentation on prison 
populations.  Part V will address recent developments in this area and the push towards the 
relaxing of HHS’ total ban.  Finally, in Part VI, I will propose potential areas of regulatory 
reform, with suggestions for future development in line with contextual changes in the decades 
since these regulations were enacted. 
 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
 
The defendants in this case are charged with murder, tortures and other atrocities 
committed  in  the  name  of  medical  science.    The  victims  of  those  crimes  are 
numbered in the hundreds of thousands.  A handful are still alive; a few of the 
survivors will appear in this courtroom.  But most of these miserable victims were 
slaughtered  outright  or  died  in  the  course  of  the  tortures  to  which  they  were 
subjected. 
 
For the most part they are nameless dead.  To their murderers, these wretched 
people were not individuals at all.  They came in wholesale lots and were treated 
worse than animals.
1 
 
With this powerful condemnation, the chief counsel for the prosecution, Brigadier General 
Telford Taylor, delivered the opening statement at the Nuremberg Tribunal.
2  So began the 
                                                 
1 GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 6 (1992). 
2 See id. 3 
 
criminal proceedings against twenty-three leading German physicians for the gruesome atrocities 
committed against concentration camp prisoners under the guise of medical experimentation.
3  
The shocking accounts elicited from the Tribunal reverberated around the world, shaking into the 
public consciousness the potentially disastrous consequences of medical research on unwilling 
subjects.
4  In response, in 1946 a group of doctors and lawyers “promulgated a code of behavior 
to guide medical researched torn by sometimes conflicting desires to conquer disease and at the 
same time to respect the integrity of the individual patient.”
5  Thus was born the Nuremberg 
Code—the first international document to espouse the necessity of informed consent and 
voluntary participation in experimental research.
6  Though not binding on any individual or 
nation state, the Code laid the groundwork for an international set of norms regulating research 
                                                 
3 See Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council 
Law No. 10, United States of America v. Karl Brandt et al. (1948).  
4 See Colleen M. McCarthy, Note, Experimentation of Prisoners: The Inadequacy of Voluntary 
Consent, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 55, 57 (1989). 
5 Marian F. Ratnoff & Justin C. Smith, Human Laboratory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine, 36 
FORDHAM L. REV. 673, 673 (1968). 
6 See K.C. Kalmbach & Phillip M. Lyons, Ethical and Legal Standards for Research in Prisons, 
21 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 671, 674 (2003).  The free and informed consent portion of the Nuremberg 
Code states: 
 
1.  The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.   
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; 
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the 
intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other 
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and 
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to 
make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that 
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there 
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the 
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all 
inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his 
health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the 
experiment.  
 
ANNAS & GRODIN, supra note 1, at 2. 4 
 
in clinical trials.
7  The Code required that the consent of the experimental subject exhibit four 
critical characteristics: the consent must be competent, voluntary, informed, and 
comprehending.
8 
  In 1964, the World Medical Association released its own guidance document directed 
towards medical doctors conducting research on human subjects.
9  This Declaration of Helsinki 
in many ways superseded the Nuremberg Code and became the governing document for 
international research ethics.
10  Among other things, the Declaration established that research 
protocols should be reviewed by an independent committee prior to implementation, the risks of 
any trial should not exceed the predicted benefits, and that research subjects “must be adequately 
informed of the aims, methods, source of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, [and] 
institutional affiliations of the researcher.”
11   
                                                 
7 Udo Schüklenk, Protecting the vulnerable: testing times for clinical research ethics, 51 SOC. 
SCI. & MEDICINE 969, 972 (2000).  Commentators have remarked on the peculiarity of 
establishing “norms” which in fact must be strictly enforced and policed: 
 
The use of human subjects in behavioral and biomedical research is today 
circumscribed by a quite elaborate set of rules, regulations, and guidelines. These 
legal and ethical strictures give force to what are perceived as certain fundamental 
moral principles guiding man’s treatment of his fellow man. The source of these 
principles is variously traced to ‘natural law,’ man’s ‘humanity,’ or some other 
hopeful metaphysical construct whose observance would be considered, or so the 
aspiration is, a matter of course for all civilized societies. However, the 
articulation of these principles as in any way binding, as law, has generally come 
in the aftermath of historical experience that directly contradicts the benign 
assumption that they are universally shared or adhered to. 
 
Kalmbach & Lyons, supra note 6, at 672. 
8 GEORGE J. ANNAS, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT’S 
DILEMMA 7 (1977). 
9 See Kalmbach & Lyons, supra note 6, at 675. 
10 See Schüklenk, supra note 7, at 972. 
11 Kalmbach & Lyons, supra note 6, at 676. 5 
 
  The national conscience was again rocked in the early 1970s when it was discovered that 
the U.S. Public Health Service had been conducting the Tuskegee Syphilis Study for forty years, 
flagrantly violating the principles of autonomy and informed consent of research subjects.
12  The 
study involved approximately 400 African-American males who were infected with syphilis and 
denied treatment in order to study the progression of the disease.
13  Even after penicillin became 
available in the 1950s, the men were prevented from seeking treatment, were lied to and told that 
they were already being treated, and often died without appropriate medical intervention.
14  The 
study came to light in 1973, and in the face of national outrage, was finally put to an end by the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
15  In response, the National Research Act of 
1974 was passed.
16  This legislation created the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subject of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which was tasked with identifying the 
basic ethical principles to be protected in clinical research and constructing guidelines for future 
researchers with those principles in mind.
17  The Belmont Report was issued in 1979, elucidating 
the three fundamental ethical principles underlying human subject research and demonstrating 
how these principles should be applied in research protocols.
18  These principles—respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice—laid the ethical foundation which continues to undergird 
                                                 
12 See id. at 673.  
13 See id. The men were drawn to the study through advertisements of “special free treatment” 
and were not told that they had in fact received placebos known to be ineffective. See Allen M. 
Brandt, Racism, Research and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 21 
(1978). 
14 See Kalmbach & Lyons, supra note 6, at 673. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. at 676. 
17 See id. 
18 Alison Wichman, Protecting Vulnerable Research Subjects: Practical Realities of Institutional 
Review Board Review and Approval, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 88, 89 (1998). 6 
 
current law governing research on humans.
19  “Respect for persons” highlights the autonomy and 
dignity of human beings and requires that subjects give informed consent in order to participate 
in research studies.
20  “Beneficence” ensures that the harms of research are minimized while the 
benefits are maximized, which requires a risk/benefit analysis of the research protocol ex ante by 
an institutional review board.
21  Finally, the principle of “justice” speaks to the selection of 
research subjects to ensure that certain classes of individuals are not “systematically selected for 
or excluded from research, unless there are scientifically or ethically valid reasons for doing 
so.”
22 
 
II. HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON PRISONERS 
 
What  happened  at  Holmesburg  was  just  as  gruesome  as  Tuskegee,  but  at 
Holmesburg it happened smack dab in the middle of a major city, not in some 
backwoods  in  Alabama.    It  just  goes  to  show  how  prisons  are  truly  distinct 
institutions where the walls don’t just serve to keep inmates in, they also serve to 
keep public eyes out.
23   
 
These words of Allen M. Hornblum, the author of “Acres of Skin,” exemplify the view of 
many looking back on the history of research on prisoners in the United States.  The stories of 
atrocities inflicted on inmates prior to the promulgation of the Belmont Report are striking.  The 
earliest known experimentation on prisoners in the United States began in 1914, when twelve 
Mississippi inmates were infected with pellagra, a disease which causes diarrhea, dermatitis, 
dementia, and possibly death.
24  The experiment involved the inducement of the disease in order 
                                                 
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 90. 
22 Id. 
23 Ian Urbina, Panel Suggests Using Inmates in Drug Trials, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug 13, 2006. 
24 Sharona Hoffman, Beneficial and Unusual Punishment: An Argument in Support of Prisoner 
Participation in Clinical Trials, 33 IND. L. REV. 475, 482 (2000). 7 
 
to study the effect of diet on its progression; despite begging to be released from the trial after 
suffering severe symptoms, the prisoners were forced to continue the experiment.
25  Testicular 
transplant experiments were conducted on five hundred prisoners at San Quentin, California to 
test whether lost male potency could be reinvigorated.
26  In the 1940s, in an attempt to develop 
new drugs to treat malaria during World War II, Chicago-area doctors infected four hundred 
prisoners with the disease—these studies would later be cited by Nazi doctors in the Nuremberg 
trials as precedent to defend their own research supposedly conducted to aid the German war 
effort.
27 
The list goes on: in 1942, Harvard biochemist Edward Cohn injected sixty-four 
Massachusetts prisoners with beef blood in a U.S. Navy-funded experiment; in 1950, Dr. Joseph 
Stokes of the University of Pennsylvania infected two-hundred female prisoners with viral 
hepatitis; and from 1951-1960, the University of Pennsylvania, under contract with the United 
States Army, conducted psychopharmacological experiments on hundreds of prisoners.  In the 
early 1950s, nearly all participants in Phase I clinical trials across the country were prisoners, 
subject to experiments studying hepatitis, heart disease, and intestinal protozoan parasites, 
among other ailments.
28 During this period, inmates in the Ohio prison system were also injected 
with live cancer cells in both forearms in a study conducted by the Sloan Kettering Institute for 
                                                 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See id.; see also Vera Hassner Sharav, Human Experiments: A Chronology of Human 
Research, ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTION, available at 
http://www.ahrp.org/history/chronology.php. 
28 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 485. 8 
 
Cancer Research and Ohio State University.
29  Two weeks after the injection, the area of 
malignant cells was removed from one arm, but remained in the other arm indefinitely.
30 
From 1963 to 1973, the Atomic Energy Commission conducted testicular irradiation 
experiments on prisoners in Oregon and Washington to determine how much radiation astronauts 
could tolerate during space flights.
31  The researchers paid the prisoners $5 a month to undergo 
extensive radiation exposure to their testicles, and ultimately paid them $100 at the end of the 
trial when they received a vasectomy.
32  At Holmesburg Prison, between 1952 and 1974, 
University of Pennsylvania dermatologist Dr. Albert Kligman conducted experiments of skin 
products on prisoners by the hundreds.
33  He tested radioactive isotopes on the prisoners, despite 
having little education about radioactive medicine.
34  Within this same time period, thirty-three 
pharmaceutical companies tested 153 experimental drugs on the Holmesburg prisoners.
35  From 
1965-1966, Dow Chemical used these prisoners for dioxin experiments, a component of Agent 
Orange.
36  It is reported that Kligman exposed prisoners to 7500 micrograms of the highly toxic 
substance, 486 times the dosage he was advised to administer by Dow Chemical.
37   Upon his 
first visit to the prison in 1966, Dr. Kligman famously stated, “All I saw before me were acres of 
skin.”
38  In a similar vein of objectification, a researcher in 1973 was quoted as remarking in 
                                                 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 486. 
32 Sharav, supra note 27. 
33 See id. 
34 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 487. 
35 See id.  See also Urbina, supra note 23. 
36 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 487. 
37 Id. 
38 ALLEN M. HORNBLUM, ACRES OF SKIN: HUMAN EXPERIMENTS AT HOLMESBURG PRISON xx 
(1998). 9 
 
confidence that prisoners are “. . . fine experimental material . . . and much cheaper than 
chimpanzees.”
39 
 
III. THE ETHICS OF THE DEBATE 
 
The ethical implications of clinical research on prisoners are brought most starkly into 
relief when considering the principle of “respect for persons.”  On the one hand, respect for 
prisoners as autonomous agents capable of rational decision-making seems to require that 
prisoners not be deprived of the opportunity to volunteer in clinical research studies.
40   
Alternatively, the particularities of incarceration may present unavoidable coercion or undue 
influence, such that respect for prisoners may warrant barring them from participation in research 
to ensure that they do not subject themselves to greater risk that they would if not incarcerated.  
It is ultimately these competing visions of “true” respect which animate the debate over the 
moral and ethical permissibility of clinical research on prisoners. 
A.  Arguments Against Research on Prisoners 
1.  Inability to Give Sufficiently Free and Informed Consent 
 
One of the strongest statements against research on prisoners comes from Patricia King, a 
member of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research.  In her resounding refutation of the possibility of a prisoner’s informed 
consent to nontherapeutic research, she argued that prisons are total institutions which, by their 
inherent character and purpose, make sufficiently free consent to research unattainable: “I, 
                                                 
39 Gregory Dober, Cheaper Than Chimpanzees: Expanding the Use of Prisoners in Medical 
Experiments, 19 PRISON LEGAL NEWS 1, 1 (2008). 
40 See Rachel Wener, Not Situated to Exercise Free Power of Choice: Human Subject Research 
in Prison Settings, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 365, 369 (2007). 10 
 
personally, do not believe that theoretically one can ever remove enough of the constraints from 
a prison to afford self-determination because by the time you removed them all you would not 
have a prison.”
41  Others have similarly argued that the experience of incarceration engenders 
motivations in prisoners which induce them to participate in experiments under conditions to 
which they would not consent if free.
42  The inability to disambiguate those prisoners who are 
capable of giving sufficiently free consent from those who are not also animates the discussion.
43  
As espoused by a federal court in Maryland, the two critical elements necessary to establish 
informed consent under American law are information and voluntariness.
44  In this context, 
“voluntariness” means the following: “[t]he person consenting must be ‘so situated as to be able 
to exercise free power of choice without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, 
deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or coercion.’”
45  It is argued that subtle forms of 
coercion in the prison context act to undermine freedom of choice and deprive a prisoner of the 
right to be “master of his own body.”
46 
2. Motivations for Prisoners to Participate in Medical Experiments  
 
  The most commonly cited incentives for prisoners to volunteer for nontherapeutic 
research include: the ability to obtain financial compensation, hope for a reduction of sentence or 
greater likelihood of being released on parole, seeking of psychiatric or medical help, relief from 
the tedium of prison existence, desire for better living conditions, attraction of risk-taking, and 
                                                 
41 Roy Branson, National Commission Says ‘No, Unless…,’ THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 15, 
17 (1977). 
42 See, e.g., Colleen M. McCarthy, Experimentation on Prisoners: The Inadequacy of Voluntary 
Consent, Note, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 55, 60 (1989). 
43 See Branson, supra note 41, at 17. 
44 Baily v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 220 (D. Md. 1979). 
45 McCarthy, supra note 42, at 61. 
46 Marian F. Ratnoff & Justin C. Smith, Human Laboratory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine, 36 
FORDHAM L. REV. 673, 684 (1968). 11 
 
altruism.
47  From a legal perspective, the conditions that give rise to these motivations may 
constitute duress such as would render a contract voidable and, analogously, undercut a 
prisoner’s “informed consent” to participation in research.
48   
In regard to the motivation of financial reward, the primary question to determine 
coercion is whether there are alternative sources of equal income and whether consenting to 
participate in research is the only way prisoners can earn enough money to sustain a minimum 
standard of living.
49  The amount of money paid for participation in drug trials vis-à-vis wages 
for other types of prison work is particularly salient.  One study notes:  
[T]he amount of pay offered to prisoners to participate in drug trials may be three 
to fifteen times as great as the rate of pay for other jobs available in the prison. . . . 
[T]his constitutes an undue inducement to participate in research.  At the same 
time, the amount of money drug firms pay to prisoner volunteers is approximately 
one-tenth that customarily paid to free-living volunteers . . . . [T]his constitutes an 
incentive to drug companies to do most of their drug testing on prisoners.
50 
 
A related motivation to participate in drug trials is the difference in environment between the 
normal prison wards and the area which houses research subjects.   A specific example from the 
Maryland House of Corrections illuminates this potentially coercive element.
51  The facts of 
Bailey v. Mandel
52 describe a prison filled with 1640 inmates, 700 more than its maximum 
capacity, and ceaseless noise, violence, and homosexual attacks.
53  The prisoners were required 
to purchase all health and hygiene products from the commissary, including soap, toothpaste, 
                                                 
47 See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 
61, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-131 (1976) 
[hereinafter REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 62. 
50 McCarthy, supra note 42, at 62. 
51 See ANNAS, supra note 8, at 113. 
52 Md. District Ct., K-74-1102 (filed Oct. 8, 1974). 
53 ANNAS, supra note 8, at 113. 12 
 
razor blades, and deodorant, which were sold at a cost equal to or greater than that in a grocery 
store.
54  The estimated cost of these items was $11 every two weeks, yet the average pay for 
most prison jobs was $0.65 per day.
55  Thus, the prisoners could not afford to maintain even a 
minimum standard of personal hygiene.  In comparison, the Infectious Disease Area which 
housed participants in research studies was spacious, well-lit, air-conditioned, had a color 
television and a kitchen stocked with food.
56  The subjects were given comfortable beds and 
permitted to take frequent private showers.
57  The compensation for research subjects was $10 
per day.
58  The coercion inherent in this situation is the fact that participation in the research 
experiment was the only way prisoners could achieve a minimum standard of living.
59  Thus, 
their willingness to be exposed to typhoid, dysentery, malaria, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, 
influenza, and cholera were unduly influenced by the horrendous living conditions they would 
remain in if they refused to participate.
60 
  Other prisoners cite fear as a motivating factor in the participation in medical research 
and consequent removal from the typical prison setting.  Being placed in the separate research 
unit allowed prisoners to sleep “without being afraid someone [will] ‘bust them in the head’ or 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 114.  In the words of one professor of law and ethics, “When the ‘reward’ is such as 
only to give us the necessary conditions of [basic] rights and freedoms—when all that the reward 
does is to bring us up to a level of living to which we are entitled, and of which we have been 
deprived by man—then the ‘reward,’ I think, constitutes duress.  A reward which accrues to one 
who has achieved this level, or who can easily achieve it ... and which hence serves only to grant 
us ‘luxury’ items, does not constitute duress, and hence does not render choice unfree, no matter 
how great this reward may be.” Id. at 114-15. 
60 See id. at 113. 13 
 
‘set fire’ to their bunks while they [sleep].”
61  Similarly, in Statesville Prison in Illinois, where an 
antimalarial drug research experiment was conducted in 1974, fear of attack was so pervasive 
throughout the prisoner community that almost forty men requested relocation to solitary 
confinement for their own safety.
62 
The motivation of reprieve from the monotony and boredom of prison life also may play 
a role in a prisoner’s decision to volunteer in a research study.  As an example, prisoners in the 
Maryland House of Correction without jobs spend sixteen to seventeen hours per day alone in 
their cells.
63  Escape from this tedious existence at any cost may constitute undue influence on 
the choices of prisoners.  
The “parole incentive” is another hugely influential factor in a prisoner’s decision-
making, and one which must be examined carefully and policed heavily.  Well into the 1950s, it 
was common for prisoners to be rewarded for participation in medical research by early parol or 
the commutation of one’s sentence.
64  In 1948, the Governor of Illinois formed a committee to 
examine the practice of paroling prisoners who volunteered as subjects in malaria research.
65  
The Green Committee, as it was called, determined that although “a reduction of sentence in 
prison . . . can amount to undue influence,” the parole system was meant to reward “good 
conduct and industry” and “exceptional bravery or fidelity in a good cause.”
66  As such, the 
practice of paroling research volunteers was deemed permissible.
67  To this day, the hope that a 
parole board will view a prisoner’s contribution to medical progress favorably may continue to 
                                                 
61 McCarthy, supra note 42, at 64. 
62 ANNAS, supra note 8, at 115. 
63 Bailey, 481 F. Supp. at 205. 
64 See McCarthy, supra note 42, at 63. 
65 See ANNAS, supra note 8, at 116. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. 14 
 
animate decisions of consent.  In the Bailey case, for example, the doctors conducting the 
research would write a letter to the parole board informing them of the inmate’s participation in 
the study.
68  Whether or not this practice was permitted to play any role in the parole board’s 
decision making process, it nonetheless may have unduly influenced a prisoner to volunteer on 
the off chance of a possible benefit in parole.
69  A 1975 case filed in Connecticut alleged that two 
of the three prisoner-plaintiffs had been denied parole and were told that their denials were due 
to their lack of participation in a research study.
70  At this time, Connecticut’s public policy 
explicitly denounced the practice of considering prisoner participation in experiments in regard 
to parole decisions.
71  However, after this case was filed, the correctional facility soon settled 
with the plaintiffs, the prisoners were given new parole hearings in front of a board which was 
unfamiliar with the research study, and all three were granted parole.
72  According to American 
jurisprudence, the threat of imprisonment satisfies the legal definition of duress.
73  Thus, the 
promise of release from prison or a reduction in sentence as a reward for participation in an 
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experiment is inherently coercive, for the implicit assertion is that refusal to participate will 
result in the continuation of imprisonment.
74 
B. Arguments For Research on Prisoners 
 
  As discussed herein, the question of coercion and voluntariness is a primary concern in 
conducting research on prisoners.  However, even in the Commission Report which led to the 
HHS ban on research on inmates, the data was conflicted and this issue was far from clear.  At 
that time, a group of sociologists presented the Commission with data indicating that prisoners 
were in fact able to voluntarily consent.
75  Three types of prisoner profiles emerged from their 
study, each of which rejected the notion that prisons as an institution implicitly hinder freedom 
of choice.
76  The first profile was a prisoner who identified strongly with prison life and would 
likely refuse to participate in research given that this activity would seem too cooperative with 
the prison regime.  The second profile was prisoners who identify with social norms and would 
like to volunteer for research out of altruism.  The third model was an independent actor who 
would conduct an internal cost-benefit calculus and choose to participate when it would 
maximize their comfort level without too great a risk.
77  The conclusion of these sociologists was 
opposed to banning research in prisons; rather they argued that prisoner research should be 
allowed but that an oversight board should ensure that the subjects were fully informed of the 
risks and benefits of the research.
78 
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1. A Special Moral Privilege 
 
  The history of prisoner research, despite the instances of coercion and abuse, also 
provides an interesting example of the salutary aspects of allowing inmates to volunteer as 
research subjects.  During World War II, as a means of demonstrating their patriotism and 
contributing to the war effort, prisoners would volunteer to test drugs needed by soldiers.
79  For 
example, prisoners would test the effectiveness of synthetic anti-malarial drugs in response to 
quinine shortages caused by the war.
80   This self-sacrifice in the name of the war was viewed by 
both prisoners and the American populace at large as a “special moral privilege,” and at one 
point the American Medical Association even considered barring from participation those 
prisoners who had committed particularly heinous crimes.
81  
2. Eighth Amendment Claims 
 
  There is also a constitutional aspect to the denial of allowing prisoners as a population to 
participate in medical research studies.  Prohibiting “seriously ill prisoners from participating 
voluntarily in clinical research may constitute [a] . . . contravention of their constitutional rights 
under the Eight Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.”
82  Inmates 
suffering from hepatitis, HIV, and tuberculosis may be deprived of life-saving therapies if unable 
to participate in research on potential cures for those diseases.
83  The Eighth Amendment of the 
Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment.”
84  While the language of 
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the Amendment was originally narrowly interpreted, later Supreme Court cases expanded the 
definition of “cruel and unusual punishment” to encompass “broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”
85  This conception includes the medical 
treatment an inmate does or does not receive while incarcerated.
86  To prevail on an allegation of 
an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must “establish a grave deprivation of rights to which 
prison officials have reacted with deliberate indifference.”
87  A successful deliberate indifference 
claim based on improper medical treatment in prison must show that “prison officials (1) were 
aware of the individual’s serious medical need; and (2) disregarded, ignored, or refused to 
provide the inmate with treatment for that need.”
88  If the alleged Eighth Amendment violation 
stems from a prison policy rather than the acts of a particular prison official, the regulation is 
considered valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”
89  The four factor 
test to assess the reasonableness of the regulation states: 
(1) ‘there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation and 
the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;’ (2) the court should 
determine whether there are alternative means of exercising the constitutional 
right that remains open to the inmates; (3) the court is to consider the impact that 
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards, other 
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the court should assess 
whether there are ready alternatives to the prison regulation – the absence of such 
ready alternatives suggests that the regulation is reasonable while their existence 
may be evidence of the opposite.
90 
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The Eighth Amendment claims can cut both ways in regards to drug research on 
prisoners.  In one context, as seen in the case of Bailey v. Lally,
91 prisoners filed a class action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that they had been coerced to participate in clinical 
investigations and therefore had been subject to cruel and unusual punishment.
92  However, the 
alternative perspective views the deprivation of life-saving, cutting edge medical treatments from 
an entire class of persons as unconstitutional punishment which violates the Eighth Amendment.  
Desperately ill patients in prison may see clinical trials as the last chance to receive potentially-
effective treatment given their highly circumscribed ability to access high-cost and quality health 
care while incarcerated.
93  An illustrative example of this situation is the disproportionately high 
rates of HIV infection among the incarcerated.  A 1992 study found that while the incidence rate 
of HIV in the general population was 18 out of 100,000, the rate among prisoners was 
approximately 362 per 100,000.
94  AIDS is the leading killer in correctional facilities, accounting 
for up to two-thirds of all inmate deaths in certain states.
95  While current AIDS treatments 
ameliorate some of the symptoms of the disease, participation in clinical trials could offer 
prisoners otherwise-unattainable access to cutting-edge drugs and experimental techniques.
96  
Although no court as of yet has rendered a decision on this issue, “[r]egulations prohibiting 
seriously ill prisoners from participation in clinical trials in all cases, including those in which 
their exclusion results in the denial of potentially life-saving therapy, are vulnerable to 
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constitutional attack.”
97  The jurisprudential foundation was laid in 1976 when the Supreme 
Court stated that the government is obligated to provide medical care for prisoners, and that 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”
98  To prevail on a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 claim of a constitutional violation, a prisoner must show that the failure to allow her access 
to a clinical study is so grave as to violate “contemporary standards of decency.”
99  She must also 
prove that the prison officials have shown deliberate indifference to her medical condition and 
that her future health may be jeopardized as a result.
100 
While the ability of a prisoner to successfully argue these elements of a § 1983 claim may 
appear dubious, it is telling to note that the Court in other prisoner-health related contexts has 
allowed complaints to go forward which focus on a potential health problem in the future.  For 
example, in Helling v. McKinney,
101 a prisoner alleged that he was suffering cruel and unusual 
punishment due to his placement in a cell with an inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a 
day, sold to him by the prison.
102  This cell assignment, he argued, rendered him unable to escape 
the deleterious consequences of second-hand smoke inhalation.
103  After numerous appeals, the 
Supreme Court found that the complainant had stated a valid cause of action under the Eighth 
Amendment and would be permitted to put on evidence that society objectively considered the 
risk “to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone 
unwillingly to such a risk” and that prison officials had shown deliberate indifference to the 
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health hazards caused by this living arrangement.
104  While not directly analogous, the Supreme 
Court’s finding that this complaint was potentially meritorious on an Eighth Amendment 
violation makes it more likely that the deprivation of access to clinical trials may rise to the level 
of a constitutional violation.
105 
3. Fourteenth Amendment Claims 
 
  The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment may also 
mandate the inclusion of prisoners in clinical trials.
106  Prisoners may contend that a law or 
regulation which bars their participation in trials is “depriving them of the liberty to enjoy the 
benefits of clinical research or is endangering their lives if it is precluding access to potential 
life-saving treatment.”
107  Putative inmate-plaintiffs may also argue that their status as prisoners 
is an invalid basis on which to subject them to unequal treatment.
108  These arguments formed 
the basis of the claim in Fante v. Department of Health and Human Services,
109 which, as I will 
explain, led the FDA to halt the implementation of its proposed regulation barring research on 
prisoners in trials of FDA-regulated products.
110   
The state would likely argue that its reason for limiting research on prisoners is animated 
by its concern for the risk of coerced or involuntary consent.   However, this compelling interest 
could likely be achieve through less restrictive means such as more stringent Institutional 
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Review Board (IRB) guidelines, uniform research protocol, and a focus on improving the other 
coercive elements of prison life.
111 
4. Controlled and Diverse Population 
 
Use of prisoners in nontherapeutic research became commonplace after WWII due to the 
highly controlled conditions available in a prison environment—ideal for isolating only those 
variables one intends to study.
112  The ability to control a subject’s diet, stimuli, environment, 
interactions with others, and a host of other factors is highly unique to an institutionalized setting 
such as a prison and may allow researchers to obtain more accurate results without unpredictable 
external influences.  The diversity of the prison population may also aid the scientific validity of 
clinical research data.  Traditionally, women, African-Americans, and Hispanics have all been 
underrepresented in clinical trials.
113  A lack of gender and racial diversity in study populations 
adversely impacts the universality of the data and may harm future patients as well as the 
scientific community at large.
114  Thus, the ability to incorporate these populations within a 
research subject pool would arguably improve both the lives of the prisoners and the results of 
the scientific study. 
 
IV. CURRENT REGULATION OF HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH 
 
While the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) constitutes the umbrella 
federal agency sponsoring biomedical and behavioral research, its component parts include the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Indian Health 
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Service, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
115  Regulatory jurisdiction 
over human experimentation in the United States has historically been split between the Food 
and Drug Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services.
116  HHS issued 
regulations to govern research conducted or funded by government agencies, codified at 45 
C.F.R. § 46.
117  The FDA promulgated similar regulations dictating the required informed 
consent in research and clinical trials involving FDA-regulated products.
118  These regulations, 
issued at 21 C.F.R. § 50 (protection of human subjects) and § 56 (Institutional Review Boards), 
present the minimum requirements of information given to clinical subjects, particularly the 
balance of risks and benefits.
119  They also emphasize that no coercion may be applied to 
potential subjects in making their decision about whether or not to participate in the study.
120   In 
1991, the core HHS regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 46, Subpart A were formally adopted by over a 
dozen other federal departments and agencies that conduct or fund human subject research and 
became the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, or “Common Rule.”
121 While 
this Federal Policy is now shared by seventeen departments and agencies, most privately-
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sponsored research is regulated by the FDA under 21 C.F.R. § 50 and § 56.
122  Although the 
FDA regulations and the Common Rule are predominately parallel, a few significant differences 
exist.
123  One primary difference is the identification by HHS of certain classes of research 
subjects which require unique protections in research protocol. 
A. HHS Regulation of Research on Prisoners 
 
The HHS regulations specifically discuss “vulnerable populations,” reflecting the policy 
in the Belmont Report that the principle of “respect for persons” warrants additional protections 
for individuals with diminished autonomy.
124 Thus, the subpart concerning criteria for IRB 
approval of research stipulates a higher threshold of protection in research protocols where 
certain populations are involved: “When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to 
coercion or undue influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled 
persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, additional safeguards have 
been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.
125   
Subpart C of the Common Rule addresses in detail the restrictions on federally-funded 
research on prisoners.  These restrictions, which have been in place since 1978, apply not only to 
research conducted by a federal agency or directly funded by federal capital, but also to private 
institutions which receive federal funding for any purpose, even if the research in question does 
not involve federal dollars.
126   The regulations forbid all biomedical or behavioral research on 
prisoners except studies particularly related to incarceration: the causes and effects of 
incarceration and criminal behavior, research on prisons as institutional structures, or the study 
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of conditions particularly affecting prisoners as a class.
127  As could be expected, this regulation 
significantly reduced the scope of research on prisoners to only those trials conducted by fully 
private, independent corporations.
128   
Subpart C was enacted after the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects and Biomedical and Behavioral Research published its Report and Recommendations: 
Research Involving Prisoners in 1976.
129  Under the mandate set forth in section 202(a)(2) of the 
National Research Act, the Commission “studied the nature and extent of research involving 
prisoners, the conditions under which such research is conducted and the possible grounds for 
continuation, restriction or termination of such research,.”
130  The Report detailed the state of 
research involving prisoners at the time, noting that both private pharmaceutical companies and 
governmental agencies use prisoners as subjects.
131  Among other research, the Report discussed 
the study of the effects of irradiation on male reproductive function, funded by the Atomic 
Energy Commission; a study of potential addictive properties of untested analgesics on prisoners 
with history of drug addiction; and the experimental “treatment” of aggressive behavior with 
drugs, aversive conditioning techniques, and behavior modification through the deprivation of 
basic amenities.
132  The Commission discussed the increased public sentiment against research 
on prisoners since the 1960s, as well as the Health Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare hearings in 1973 which cited exploitation and the impossibility of 
obtaining informed consent as reasons to prohibit research in prisons.
133  The Report went on to 
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highlight concern about abuses of psychosurgery and behavior modification programs in prisons, 
and cited the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prison’s determination that participation by 
prisoners under federal jurisdiction in any medical experimentation should be phased out.
134 
The Commission highlighted two main ethical dilemmas concerning the use of prisoners 
as clinical research subjects: “(1) whether prisoners bear a fair share of the burdens and receive a 
fair share of the benefits of research; and (2) whether prisoners are, in the words of the 
Nuremberg Code, ‘so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice’ – that is, whether 
prisoners can give truly voluntary consent to participate in research.”
135  Though this document 
predated the Belmont Report, the Commission alluded to the fundamental ethical principles 
which would later come to create the foundation of human subject research regulation.  The 
Report noted that disproportionate use of prisoners in specific kinds of research would violate the 
principle of “justice,” which requires that individuals and groups be treated fairly, and coercive 
prison environments may compromise the principle of “respect for persons” which requires the 
protection of individual autonomy.
136  The Report conceded that these issues were not 
undisputed, and upholding the principles of respect for persons and justice could in fact cut the 
other way.  Respect for a person may require deference to his or her deliberate choice to 
volunteer for research, and systematic deprivation of the freedom to participate in clinical trials 
may violate the principle of justice, as it would deprive prisoners of benefits available to 
others.
137   
However, the Commission stated its ultimate decision after weighing these competing 
principles, declaring, “When persons seem regularly to engage in activities which, were they 
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stronger or in better circumstances, they would avoid, respect dictates that they be protected 
against those forces that appear to compel their choices.  It has become evident to the 
Commission that, although prisoners who participate in research affirm that they do so freely, the 
conditions of social and economic deprivation in which they live compromise their freedom.  
The Commission believes, therefore, that the appropriate expression of respect consists in 
protection from exploitation.”
138    With that, the vast majority of federally funded research on 
prisoners came to an end. 
B. FDA Regulation of Research on Prisoners 
 
  Unlike HHS regulations which only apply to research institutions that receive federal 
funding, the FDA’s regulatory authority extends to any research pertaining to products under its 
jurisdiction.
139  While in many respects the FDA regulations closely resemble the Common Rule, 
including a similar Subpart D governing children as research subjects, conspicuously absent is 
any Subpart C or regulation of research on prisoners.
140  However, this was not always the case.  
In May of 1980, around the same time that HHS was promulgating its Common Rule, the FDA 
proposed a similar de facto ban on non-therapeutic, experimental research on prisoners.
141  The 
FDA was seemingly convinced by the Commission’s finding of prisons as inherently coercive 
institutions and relied on the conclusion that researchers could never establish a compelling need 
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to use prisoners as opposed to other research subjects.
142  In addition to the requirement that any 
research on prisoners must be therapeutic, other criteria were enumerated: an institutional review 
board would have to find that “(1) living conditions in the prison were adequate so that prisoners 
were not being unduly influenced by the rewards of being research subjects; (2) nonprisoner 
volunteers would accept the same risks that the prisoners were being asked to accept; (3) 
procedures for the selection of the subjects were fair; (4) relevant information was provided in 
language understandable to the subjects; (5) prisoners’ participation would not be taken into 
account by parole boards; and (6) followup examination and care would be available and that 
subjects would be so informed.”
143  Following its proposal in the Federal Register, this ban on 
nontherapeutic research was to become effective on June 1, 1981.
144  However, this date was 
stayed after a lawsuit was filed challenging the regulation.
145 
  On July 29, 1980, four prisoners from the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson 
filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking a 
declaratory judgment invalidating the FDA proposed regulation and granting injunctive relief 
against its enforcement.
146  In November of that year, the Upjohn Company, which conducted 
the majority of its pharmaceutical research at the Jackson penitentiary, intervened as a plaintiff in 
the suit.
147  Claiming that the FDA’s proposed ban violated the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fifth Amendment, the plaintiffs alleged that: 
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[t]he effect of the [FDA] proposal would be to eliminate clinical testing at 
Jackson and similar facilities, because most of the pharmaceutical studies at 
prisons involve ‘nontherapeutic’ research . . . [and] closing down such programs 
would deprive prisoners of their right freely to decide whether to participate in 
such programs, would deprive state correctional institutions of the rehabilitative 
and economic benefits for prisoners of such programs, and would injure the 
public by depriving pharmaceutical companies of the most suitable populations 
for certain kinds of studies . . . .
148 
 
In response to the lawsuit, the FDA notified the public that the effective date of the 
regulation would be stayed until five months following the district court’s judgment on the 
merits of the suit.
149  On December 18, 1981, the FDA issued a reproposal of the rule noting the 
concerns expressed in the pending lawsuit and attempting to address those challenges with a 
reformulation of the regulation.
150  Unlike the earlier version of the regulation, the reproposal did 
not place an outright ban on nontherapuetic research.
151  The FDA ultimately settled the case, 
explaining in the Federal Register that because only a small number of prisoners were actually 
used in nontherapeutic research, it was an inefficient use of agency time and resources to litigate 
the suit and uphold the validity of its proposed regulation.
152  The notice in the Federal Register 
also explained that the agency was reconsidering its prior position based on “questions that have 
been raised concerning the need, utility, and costs” of the rule and planned to take another look 
at the proposed regulation, while indefinitely staying its implementation in the meantime without 
providing for public comment.
153  Following that notice, the indefinitely suspended regulations 
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were ultimately removed from the Code of Federal Regulations and Subpart C of 21 C.F.R. Part 
50 has remained “reserved.”
154   
   
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. 2006 IOM Report 
 
  The contrasting regulations of public and privately-funded nontherapeutic research on 
prisoners remained uncontested for nearly three decades until July of 2006.  At that time, the 
Institute of Medicine released a report recommending that the government loosen its regulations 
on the use of prisoners as research subjects.
155  The publication of these recommendations 
invoked a wave of controversy and reintroduced the dispute over coercive prison environments 
into the public conversation.  As one media outlet reported, “…it has dredged up a painful 
history of medical mistreatment and incited debate among prison rights advocates and 
researchers about whether prisoners can truly make uncoerced decisions, given the environment 
they live in.”
156  The shortage of potential research subjects available to the biomedical industry, 
coupled with fourfold increase in the prison population in the last 30 years—now consisting of 
approximately 2.3 million inmates—has created pressure to examine the reopening of prison 
gates to federally-funded medical researchers.
157  As explained in the report, “The charge of our 
Committee, the Institute of Medicine Committee on Ethical Considerations for Revisions to the 
DHHS Regulations for Protection of Prisoners Involved in Research, was to explore whether the 
conclusions reached in 1976 by the National Commission for the protection of Human Subjects 
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of Biomedical and Behavioral Research remain appropriate today.”
158  The Committee 
acknowledged that past abuse of research on prisoners “has engendered deep distrust among 
prisoners and their advocates” and that the prisoner population is comprised of a 
“disproportionate representation of . . . historically disenfranchised populations.”
159   
However, the report countered that a total ban on prisoner research was a mistaken 
approach, noting that: 
[r]esearch affords the potential of great benefit as well as burden.  It can help 
policy makers to make correctional settings more humane and effective in 
achieving legitimate social goals such as deterrence and rehabilitation.  Research 
can also help policy makers better understand and respond to the myriad health 
problems faced by prisoners such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis C, mental 
illness, and substance abuse.  Respect for prisoners also requires recognition of 
their autonomy.  If a prisoner wants to participate in research, his or her views 
should be taken into account.  The overall goal, then, is to permit scientifically 
rigorous research to the extent that it confers significant benefit without undue 
risk and in accordance with the prisoner’s wishes.
160 
 
In weighing these factors, the Committee found that the current federal regulation regime did not 
strike the proper balance between scientific advancement and prisoner protection.
161  The “most 
glaring problem,” at the Report termed it, was that the federal rules covered only a small part of 
the research conducted in prisons—that which is funded by certain federal agencies covered by 
45 C.F.R. Part 46.
162  As such, one of the major changes that the Committee recommended was 
the implementation of universal standards of protection so that prisoner research safeguards 
would be implemented across the board regardless of the funding source of the research.
163  The 
other four main recommendations included: 1) expanding the definition of the term “prisoner” to 
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include those on probation or parole; 2) shift from a category-based to a risk-benefit approach; 3) 
include collaborative responsibility into the ethical framework around this research; and 4) 
enhance the rigor of human subject protections with more stringent oversight.
164 
B. 2011 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
 
  On July 22, 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services announced its intention 
to update the Common Rule in order to “ensure the highest standards of protections for human 
subjects involved in research, while enhancing effectiveness of oversight.”
165  In its press release 
announcing the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, HHS noted that the Common Rule has 
been in its current version since 1991 and that “an increase in multi-site studies have highlighted 
ambiguities in the current rules and have led to questions about whether the current regulatory 
framework is effectively keeping up with the needs of researchers and research subjects.”
166  The 
release went on to quote Harold Koh, HHS assistant secretary for Health, who remarked, “The 
adoption of the Common Rule two decades ago was a landmark event to ensure ethical practices 
and the safety of those individuals who participate in research.  This regulatory review effort is 
primarily about enhancing protections for human subjects.  The changes under consideration 
offer the promise of updating and enhancing those protections to keep pace with current 
challenges.”
167  The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register reiterates 
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this theme of hoping to find a contemporary balance between protecting human subjects while 
“facilitating valuable research and reducing burden, delay, and ambiguity for investigators.”
168   
The Notice refers a few times to prisoners as a vulnerable population and the possibility 
for changes to Subpart C of the HHS Regulations.  It also references changes that have been 
proposed by the Institute of Medicine which are being considered for adoption, and notes that 
public comment is being sought on these proposals.  The agency acknowledges that, “The intent 
is to revise the Common Rule recognizing that other laws and regulations, such as the other 
subparts of the HHS human subjects protection regulations (Subparts B, C, and D, which deal 
with particular populations of vulnerable subjects…), FDA regulations, and the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule most likely will be affected and will need to be harmonized, as appropriate, with any 
proposed regulatory changes made to the Common Rule.”
169  The Notice also speaks at length to 
the goal of clarifying and harmonizing regulatory requirements and agency guidance, given the 
contradictory regulatory framework of the various agencies tasked with human subject research 
oversight.
170  Comments were solicited through September 26, 2011,
171 but the public comment 
period was later extended upon request for one additional month through October 26, 2011.
172  A 
brief review of a handful of these comments yields interesting results.  For example, an 
MD/MPH from the Rollins School of Public Health at Emory University wrote to encourage 
reconsideration of the provisions for research on prisoners, citing the 2006 IOM report for its 
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suggestions in improving oversight while opening the door to further research.
173  Another 
comment from a Ph.D. at East Carolina University emphasizes the need to universalize the 
Subparts of the Common Rule across agencies.
174  The comments submitted by researchers and 
medical doctors at the University of Rochester highlight the undue burden and inefficiency 
caused by the interpretation of Subpart C as including “incidental prisoners,” or research subjects 
who had already volunteered to participate in a trial and subsequently became incarcerated.
175  
According to the comment, the mandated re-review of ongoing studies to identify this element is 
costly, time-consuming, and has no relation to the concerns about coercing prisoners to enroll in 
clinical trials while already imprisoned.
176   
This ongoing discussion should yield results in the form of a new HHS rule regarding 
human subject research in the very near future.  It remains to be seen whether the 
recommendations of the IOM will usher in major changes to the regulatory landscape of research 
on prisoners, and to what extent any changes made by HHS will affect the regulatory approach 
taken by the FDA. 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
 
  The incongruity of federal regulations based on the funding stream for medical research 
had resulted in untenable loopholes and excessive barriers to scientific progress.  The nearly 
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wholesale ban on the use of inmates in clinical trials conducted by institutions or companies 
which receive federal funding is over-inclusive and excludes those prisoners who could give 
truly voluntary, informed consent from garnering the benefits of experimental treatment.  
Conversely, the relatively scarcity of oversight for private corporations using prisoners in clinical 
trials may result in unreported abuses and coercive arrangements which rob the prisoner of his or 
her autonomy.  These divergent regulatory schemes should be brought into uniformity and 
universalized for all research involving prisoners as subjects.   
  Part C of the Common Rule promulgated by HHS includes important considerations for 
the composition of Institutional Review Boards when prisoners are involved in research.
177  
Specifically, these regulations require that a majority of the Board have no association with the 
prison involved, and at least one member of the Board “shall be a prisoner, or a prisoner 
representative with appropriate background and experience to serve in that capacity.”
178  The 
IRB must also ensure that any advantages accruing to participants are not of such a magnitude as 
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Each IRB shall have at least five members, with varying backgrounds to promote 
complete and adequate review of research activities commonly conducted by the 
institution. The IRB shall be sufficiently qualified through the experience and 
expertise of its members, and the diversity of the members, including 
consideration of race, gender, and cultural backgrounds and sensitivity to such 
issues as community attitudes, to promote respect for its advice and counsel in 
safeguarding the rights and welfare of human subjects. In addition to possessing 
the professional competence necessary to review specific research activities, the 
IRB shall be able to ascertain the acceptability of proposed research in terms of 
institutional commitments and regulations, applicable law, and standards of 
professional conduct and practice. The IRB shall therefore include persons 
knowledgeable in these areas. If an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a 
vulnerable category of subjects, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, or 
handicapped or mentally disabled persons, consideration shall be given to the 
inclusion of one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and 
experienced in working with these subjects. 
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compared to general “living conditions, medical care, quality of food, amenities, and opportunity 
for earnings in the prison” to constitute undue influence.
179  The Board is required to determine 
that the risks are commensurate with those that non-prisoner volunteers would agree to, that the 
information about the study is presented in understandable language, that parole boards will not 
take into account a prisoner’s participation and that the prisoner understands this fact, and that 
provisions have been made for appropriate follow-up examination or care if need be.
180   
These guidelines and limitations take into account the risks of research in a potentially 
coercive environment.  They are well-formulated and should remain in place.  I would, however, 
suggest a few alterations.  In terms of the composition of the IRB, having only one prisoner or 
prisoner representative may not be enough to adequately voice the concerns or preferences of 
prisoners as a class.  The prisoner involved should have some experience with clinical research 
and should fully understand the risks and benefits of the trial.  I am also not convinced that a 
prisoner representative can truly attest to the complexity of a lived experience inside of a prison, 
and thus would likely change this to require an actual prisoner or former prisoner to participate 
on the IRB.  Another recommended change would involve the language with which the 
information about the risks and possible benefits of the research is communicated to the subject.  
Even if a consent form is written in clear, understandable language, studies report that 
approximately sixty to seventy-five percent of incarcerated adults are unable to read.
181  Given 
the import of this staggering statistic, IRBs should ensure that prisoner subjects have an actual 
understanding of the possible risks involved in the clinical study as explained to them verbally, 
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in their native language, rather than on a piece of paper which they may or may not have been 
able to read. 
  While these aspects of the Common Rule pertaining to prisoners are appropriate and 
necessary, the permitted research involving inmates is too restrictive and should be pared back.  
Limiting the use of prisoners to research particularly related to incarceration and criminal 
behavior effectively bans the use of prisoners in any clinical trial, even that which is therapeutic 
and could provide innovative treatment.  As I have discussed above, the constitutional 
ramifications for banning seriously ill prisoners from experimental treatments signify that 
inmates should be permitted to participate under highly regulated and well-supervised 
conditions.  These less restrictive alternative means should be employed rather than depriving 
both inmates and the medical community of mutually-beneficial opportunities for research. 
  The FDA should adopt the process-related HHS regulations, as well as some of the 
proposed changes raised by the Institute of Medicine’s 2006 Report.  These additional specific 
recommendations included the creation of a public database to track studies which involve 
prisoners and the inclusion in any clinical trial of non-prisoners as well as prison subjects to 
ensure that only reasonable risks are assumed by inmates.
182  The Report also recommended the 
establishment of independent prison research advocates who will work on-site at the research 
ward and ensure that the clinicians on the ground continue to respect the autonomy of the 
prisoners throughout the research process.
183  Universalizing the regulatory landscape across all 
clinical trials on prisoners, regardless of the funding source, will ensure that prisoners will not be 
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coerced or abused in the absence of federal oversight, but will also be permitted to access life-
saving treatments through their informed consent to a federally-funded clinical trial. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  The history of research on prisoners is a study in contradictions, with some prisoners 
during wartime earnestly seeking inclusion in clinical trials to give back to their country, while 
others were concurrently subjected to unspeakable abuse at the hands of medical researchers.  
Prisoners have filed lawsuits claiming constitutional violations for being forced into a clinical 
trial, while others have alleged in court that their constitutional rights were abridged by their 
preclusion from volunteering for research.  The Department of Health and Human Services has 
placed an effective ban on all use of prisoners in clinical trials funded with federal dollars, while 
the Food and Drug Administration has very few guidelines or restrictions on the type of research 
or procedural precautions required for privately-funded research in prisons.  It is unsurprising 
that opinions on this subject vary widely, and there has been ongoing debate for decades about 
the optimal solution to balance the interests of all parties involved.   The FDA and HHS should 
harmonize their regulations in order to create a consistent scheme and to ensure that all prisoners 
are protected by a universal set of standards and guidelines.  However, it is unjust for prisoners 
as a class to be denied the tangible benefits of clinical research, particularly when a well-trained 
IRB certifies that the experiment is beneficial and does not subject the inmates to any undue risk 
of harm.  As two commentators aptly stated in reference to clinical trials of ground-breaking HIV 
drugs: 
Inmates as a group . . . need to be provided with access to clinical trials of new 
and innovative therapies that present the possibility of direct benefit. . . . They 
must be presented with the opportunity for informed choice when appropriate, 
despite recognition that the systematic deprivations and inherent coerciveness of 38 
 
the institutions and the desperate character of HIV infection compromise the 
consent process.  As in other areas of public policy and public health, HIV 
infection demands a fresh examination of equity and justice.  Whether access is 
provided to promising investigational therapies will measure the mettle, courage, 
inventiveness, and flexibility of the medical research community.  It will also test 
the humanity of correctional administrators, who must provide the setting and 
support services to permit the conduct and monitoring of clinical trials.
184 
 
This rousing call to innovation and compromise speaks to the need for policy makers and the 
medical community to reach a mutual understanding.  It is imperative for the various interests 
touched by this debate to find a practicable solution that will serve the needs of prisoners and 
scientific progress while ensuring that that abuses of the past never again come to pass. 
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